Cyber Ethiopia

We saw last week that on 16 May 1936, eleven days after the Fascist occupation of Addis Ababa, Pietro Badoglio, the newly appointed Italian Viceroy, despatched a telegram to Mussolini which proposed that the Fascist government of Ethiopia should be made at least some of the old Ethiopian ruling class. Looking more precisely on what he had in mind, he declared: "Exercised Command for Generations" "In the region between Shoa and Eritrea, there were local noble families which it was not convenient to slight because they had exercised command for generations and have authority and prestige which can be valuable for us." Such personages, he explained, included the descendants of Emperor Yohannes in Tegray, of Dajazmach Sabagadis in Agame, of the Wagshum in Lasta and other chieftains in

Yejju, Ambasel and Wallo. Beyond the Takaze river the noble families, he declared, were of "less importance", though still "usable in the administrative sub-divisions." Haile Sellase Gugsa In accordance with this policy the entire province of Tegray, he explained, had already been assigned to Dajazmach Haile Selasse Gugsa, and it seemed suitable likewise to assign Agame to Fitawrari Sabagadis, Yejju to Dajazmach Ayalew Beru, and Wag, Ambasel and Wallo to other local families. Since Ras Seyoum of Tegray, an enemy who had by now submitted, could not be "denied a certain authority in northern Ethiopia," and since his province had been already allocated to Dajazmach Haile Sellase Gugsa, the Viceroy proposed placing him in Semien or Begemder with a mandate to "pacify and govern that not easy region." Haylu Takla Haymanot The province of Gojam, Badoglio went on, had likewise formerly been ruled by King Takla Haymanot, who had enjoyed friendly relations with the Italian travellers of his day. Italy, Badoglio argued, therefore had "moral duties" towards his son, Ras Haylu, who had already shown himself "faithful to us," and whose "indisputable authority" could be of "undoubted value" even outside Gojam, for he had "profound knowledge of Shoa, Begemder and what he termed the "Galla regions near to the Blue Nile." The Viceroy therefore proposed entrusting Haylu with the administration of Gojam. Shoa: "Prudent" Treatment Shoa, the heart and most important province of the ex-empire, Badoglio believed, required especially "prudent" treatment. He accordingly proposed compromising as far as possible with the "old regime" by "allowing much, both morally and materially, to the old order of things." He therefore considered it advisable to employ in the administration "all those elements of the previous government who could be used," and he declared that they should be allowed to retain the "prerogatives" they had formerly enjoyed. Badoglio's proposals for the rest of the country also placed emphasis on ruling through traditional chiefs. The Azebo, Raia and Jejju Oromos (whom he of course referred to as "Gallas") were thus to be established as an "autonomous residency", or administrative unit. The Danakils, in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, were, he proposed, to be jointly governed from Assab, with two residencies, one on the coast and the other in the interior. Aussa was to have "a certain autonomy" under a local chief subordinate to Italian officials. The "Galla countries" south of Shoa and the Blue Nile were to retain what he chose to term their "primitive individuality," and wherever possible have "their old systems of internal rule" preserved. Harar, Part of Shoa On the other hand, Harar, which Badoglio described as "geographically an extension of the Shoan mountain system," should, he urged, remain administratively part of Shoa. This, he claimed, would have the convenience of keeping the whole of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway in Ethiopia under a single jurisdiction. "Rapid Normalisation" The above proposals, he concluded, could be expected to assist what he termed the "rapid normalisation of internal conditions." Such were the proposals which Badoglio telegraphed to Rome, on 16 May 1936. Mussolini Takes a Poor View of All This The Duce and his Fascist advisers, notably the doctrinaire Alessandro Lessona, took a poor view of the above plan, which appeared to confirm them in their opinion of the Viceroy's inability to govern in Fascist style. Badoglio's telegram was in consequence ignored. Its author soon realised that he was being given the "get lost" treatment; and, having by then looted half the Maria Threresa dollars in the Bank of Ethiopia, made clear his desire to be relieved of his post. Enter Graziani General Rodolfo Graziani, earlier the Fascist commander of the southern front, and already a war criminal renowned for his ruthless "pacification of Libya, was thereupon appointed interim Governor-General on May 21, and on the following day Badoglio, returned to Rome at his own request. Graziani, who subsequently came across a copy of Badoglio's above-mentioned telegram, later complained that its attitude was based on what he considered the misguided premise that "the government of the various regions" should be "entrusted to the great native chiefs" in recognition of "their descent and feudal influence," though "Italian officials should exercise control beside them." For his own part he rejected the above approach on the ground that though it "could have been attractive at the first moment, because it favoured the illusion of an immediate pacification, power in the hands of the great local chiefs, naturally armed, presented too great difficulties for the future." This contention was probably shared by most of the Fascist leadership in Rome, for the idea of preserving any vestiges of the former government of Ethiopia ran directly contrary to the racist and totalitarian tenets of Fascist thought. Lessona Lessona, the chief fascist theoretician of the empire, and officially the Italian Minister of the Colonies, now came forward with his own proposals. Instead of retaining Ethiopia's former administrative units, and making substantial use of the country's old aristocrats, as Badoglio had urged, he proposed the division of the Italian East African empire into five clearly defined new administrative units, each to be commanded by an Italian general. This arrangement, as Graziani later noted, meant the exclusion of the great native chiefs from any office or influence, and hence the rejection of Badoglio's idea of "indirect rule" through the traditional Ethiopian hierarchy. Lessona subsequently recalled that when he made his proposal to the Duce the latter "approved it without objection," and adds truthfully, though maliciously, that it "could not have been otherwise because Mussolini was completely in the dark regarding native politics in Abyssinia. He said to me that he wished immediately to see to the nomination of the governors. He indicated to me the name of General Pirzio Biroli, leaving me the choice of the others." The Minister of the Colonies, who was thus given permission to draft the governmental system for the empire, proceeded with the detailed formulation of his plan, and, on June 1 1936, an official ordinance for Italian East Africa, the Ordinamento organico per l' Africa Orientale Italiana was, as Graziani later recalled, "peremptorily" issued in Rome. Article 1 divided the Ethiopian empire into three governments, designed to take their place side by side with the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, both of which were much expanded territorially at Ethiopia's expense. The new administrative units consisted of Amhara, with its capital at Gondar; Galla and Sidama, with its capital at Jimma; and Harar with its capital at the city of the same name, while Addis Ababa was made into a separate governorate. The result, as R.S. Salis, a contemporary, and now justly forgotten Italian colonial authority, proudly explained, was that the Ethiopian empire lost all juridical existence in Italian law. The Ordinance went on to state, in Article 11, that each of the five governments would be under a Governor nominated by Royal Decree on the advice of the Minister of the Colonies. Such Governors, according to Articles 12 and 13, were dependent on the Italian Viceroy and had to execute general political, administrative and military orders from the Ministry of the Colonies via the Viceroy, but each Governor was responsible for his own government, and was to correspond directly with the Ministry of the Colonies on matters relating to the ordinary affairs of his government. The Governors were thus simultaneously responsible to Rome and Addis Ababa. In accordance with Lessona's plan, the government of the empire was then divided among five generals, i.e. Guzzoni in Eritrea, Mussolini''s protege Pirzio Biroli in Amhara, Geloso in Jimma, Nasi in Harar, and Santini in Somalia, Graziani was meanwhile appointed the Empire's second Viceroy on 11 June 1936. Lessona meanwhile was drawing up guidelines for the administration's attitude towards Ethiopian chiefs. In a confidential telegram sent to Graziani on 15 June, he declared that he rejected "any form of indirect government," and that "above all the re-establishment of the authority of the Rases in individual provinces should be prevented." This, he added, did not "mean that we wish to carry out a policy of repression against the Rases who have submitted and co-operated loyally with us. On the contrary Your Excellency can give freely and generously, if he wishes, in political expenses and in honorific titles. But the [native] populations must at every moment have the clear feeling that they depend exclusively on Italian authority and that the village or district chiefs whom we nominate are only native functionaries dependent on individual and regional commissioners, and are without any political authority. Personal relations with Ethiopian chiefs," he concluded, "should likewise be marked by the maximum courtesy and tact, but with the total and absolute exclusion of any act that might be interpreted as a recognition of a prestige and authority which were definitely destroyed by our victory." And that was that!