Cyber Ethiopia

We saw last week that, during the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, bitter rivalry broke out between Rodolfo Graziani, the Fascist Viceroy in Addis Ababa, and Alessandro Lessona, the Minister of the Colonies, later Minister of Italian Africa, in Rome. This rivalry became more acute towards the end of 1936, when Lessona chose to make his way to Addis Ababa, and did so, as Graziani put it, "to control the truth of things", in the supposedly "pacified" empire. An Inauspicious Start The Minister's grand tour had, however, an inauspicious start, for, during his rail journey from Jibuti to Addis Ababa, the Italian High Command learnt that the Patriots were massing along the line. At Dire Dawa, the Minister recalls, he received a telegram from Graziani warning him that the

Ethiopians were planning to attack his train. The Viceroy accordingly advised him to continue his journey by 'plane. "What would the officials and soldiers of the train's escort have thought of me", Lessona later commented, "if it continued without me? And the natives?" He accordingly decided to proceed all the way by rail, but, wisely, to avoid night travel. "In the Middle of a Battle" As anticipated the Patriots attacked, and some fifteen miles from the capital, the Minister records, "I found myself in the middle of a battle between Blackshirts and rebels." Escaped "Only Miraculously" Lessona, who was accompanied by Cobolli-Gigli, the Fascist Minister of Public Works, succeeded, after some delay, in continuing his journey to Addis Ababa, where he arrived on October 12 1936. Graziani claims that his rival escaped only "miraculously," and that the incident had the effect of persuading the latter that, contrary to official statements, "the situation was in truth not rosy." The attack, according to Poggiali, created "general satisfaction" among the Italians in Addis Ababa, who reasoned that it would force the authorities in Rome into an awareness of "the true situation in Africa. Up to now," he explains in his diary, "in Italy they do not believe in the insurgency; they believe it to be exaggerations by the military to get itself honour and to earn honours". The attack, one of the first incidents to reveal continued resistance to the occupation, also gained the Patriots some of their first international publicity. A humorous report from Jibuti, published by "New Times and Ethiopia News",in black type under the heading "Italian Minister takes Refuge under Chair," declared: "The Italian Minister of the Colonies was greatly surprised when his railway carriage was attacked. Eye-witnesses say that he hid himself under his chair, and that one of the railway servants put lots of parcels on him." Stern and Arrogant; "Stupefied Gloom" On his arrival in Addis Ababa the Fascist Minister adopted a stern and arrogant stance. Poggiali confides in his diary that the reception for the visiting luminary, on October 15, was marked by "extreme coldness." Only two chiefs, one of them Ras Seyoum, replied with a few words to the Minister's "insignificant chatter," while Lessons, following the new Fascist racial policy of isolation from the "natives," for which he was the architect, "offered his hand to no one". This, according to Poggiali, created "stupefied gloom" among the would-be Ethiopian collaborators present. They were further "disoriented", the diarist says, in that they had been led to believe that they had only two rulers, namely the Duce and his representative the Viceroy, whereas it was now apparent that the Minister was superior to the latter in the hierarchy. This created some surprise, the more so as the ministers of pre-war Ethiopia had been far less important than Rases or members of the Imperial Family. Graziani, Poggiali adds, was "most displeased with this state of affairs which impaired his authority in the eyes of the natives". Differences: More Profound During this visit it became clear that Lessona's differences with Graziani were even more profound than had previously been suspected. The Minister subsequently wrote of the latter in extremely critical terms. He claimed that "in the nervous state in which Graziani had fallen he was not in a condition to judge events in their proper light." The Viceroy's basic assumption, he complains, was that "a gesture of force on our part would be mistaken for provocation, and could produce incalculable consequences. The possible slaughter of the Addis Ababa Italians was one of his principal preoccupations". Lessona emphatically rejected this approach. He insists in his memoirs that he was of an "entirely different opinion" from Graziani as to the needs of the situation, and felt that the Viceroy's' reactions were "bereft of that dignity upon which depended the respect of the native population". Could "No Longer Be Tolerated" Determined on introducing a tougher attitude into the administration, Lassona immediately proceeded to inform the military command that "the presence of rebels nestling in the mountains a few kilometres from Addis Ababa could no longer be tolerated." A "native" brigade was accordingly ordered to prepare for immediate action against the "rebels". Though its general had reported that his men were exhausted, they were instructed to be ready to attack after forty-eight hours, for Lessona declares that he wished the "native" troops to be "on the offensive to reaffirm their military superiority, over the rebels". Badoglio (centre) looking at Addis Ababa, May 1936 The Statues During his stay in Addis Ababa, the Minister also decided to act on the vexed question of the Menilek and Lion of Judah statuses, which the Viceroy, despite Mussolini’s orders, had up to that time still failed to remove. Taking advantage of the presence of the Minister of Public Works, he decided on immediate action. Lessona recalls that, having failed to change Graziani’s view of the undersirability of dismantling the Menilek statu, he and his Fascist colleague theselves undertook the work during the night, without informing the Viceroy: a very bizarre course of action as readers will appreciate. Graziani, not surprisingly, was not a little displeased by this defiance of his views. He comments that "the two enterprising ministers, acting together without communicating anything to me, the Viceroy and Governor-General, betook themselves in the night to the monuments, and ordered some gangs of workmen to knock them down". Writing with obvious bitterness, he noted that "Cobolli-Gigli directed the act of vandalism; Lessona watched in a closed car. When the innocuous statue [of Menilek] fell, they uttered the ritualistic [i.e. Fascist cries of] alala." Turning to the implications of this act he adds: "That night brought to an end a senseless rite which exasperated the mind of the population, engendering hate, and certainly did not contribute to the auspicious pacification of minds". What about the Aksum obelisk, you may well ask: we will deal with that later! "Violent Encounters" Lessona and Graziani also clashed on economic policy. The Viceroy later recalled that there were "violent encounters between them". One of these clashes arose over plans for a Viceregal Palace in Addis Ababa, which the authorities in Rome wished to erect at a cost, Graziani says, of "a hundred millions" [of lire]. He declares that he was "firmly opposed" to the project, on the grounds that "as long as Addis Ababa lacked the most essential elements of civil life he would not have such a sum pledged for a work which was not of immediate necessity, as the New Palace [i.e. the former palace of Emperor Haile Sellassie, now Addis Ababa University] was quite enough for the needs of the moment". Mussolini, he claims, took a poor view of this argument, and "pronounced that from it one could conclude without doubt my absolute lack of imperial spirit". Behind such bickering, it should be reiterated, lay continued Fascist concern with Ethiopian Patriot resistance. The Viceroy later observed that guerrilla activity in the Addis Ababa area increased in July and August 1936, but that these events, which had "made Mussolini tremble", were later "ignored and made to be ignored. Not a word of 'arrests in the act' reached the ear. No news of them were given in the [Italian] press; so that the deluded Italian people now considered Addis Ababa 'an eldorado' of delights." Graziani and Lessona also seriously disagreed as to how to handle the "rebellion." The Viceroy recalls that he continued to be under strong pressure to adopt a policy of greater ruthlessness: "Because I wished to avoid all reprisals against the very numerous elements suspected of complicity", he declares, "I was reproached for it by Rome as a weakling, and again urged to a regime of terror. The highest orders emanating from Lessona in the name of the Head of the Government peremptorily laid down that all chiefs captured in fighting, that is to say in their role as rebels, should be executed". The conflict between the Minister and the Viceroy reached such lengths that Lessona, in his efforts to destroy Graziani, denounced him, not only for his alleged weakness, but also for his severity, notably for the execution of Aberra, one of the sons of the prominent Ethiopian nobleman Ras Kassa. Noting in his memoirs that the Ras was "the most powerful feudal leader of the Negusite Empire", Lessona claims that the young man's submission "would have represented a fact of notable importance", but that the Viceroy enticed him to surrender, and then allowed one of his henchmen, General Tracchia, to have him shot. Lessona, oblivious of his own previous exhortations towards a policy of greater ruthlessness, and ignoring the fate of Aberra's two brothers, who both of whom were also killed by the Italians, comments that "the act raised my indignation; it was an infamy and an error damaging our prestige". Graziani, he adds, "from that moment , came to considered by the natives as a faithless man". This, to use the colloquial English expression, seemed a case of "kettle calling pot black".